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Abstract
The Stoic understanding of virtue is often taken to be a non-starter. Many
of the Stoic claims about virtue – that a virtue requires moral perfection
and that all who are not fully virtuous are vicious – are thought to be
completely out of step with our commonsense notion of virtue, making
the Stoic account more of an historical oddity than a seriously defended
view. Despite many voices to the contrary, I will argue that there is a
way of making sense of these Stoic claims. Recent work in linguistics has
shown that there is a distinction between relative and absolute gradable
adjectives, with the absolute variety only applying to perfect exemplars.
I will argue that taking virtue terms to be absolute gradable adjectives –
and thus that they apply only to those who are fully virtuous – is one way
to make sense of the Stoic view. I will also show how interpreting virtue-
theoretic adjectives as absolute gradable adjectives makes it possible to
defend Stoicism against its most common objections, demonstrating how
the Stoic account of virtue might once again be a player in the contem-
porary landscape of virtue theorizing.1
Keywords: Stoicism, Virtue, Gradable Adjectives
1For helpful discussion and input on this project, I am indebted to Maria Altepeter, Julia
Annas, Stew Cohen, Juan Comesana, Robert Henderson, Christopher Kennedy, Daniel Nolan,
Nathan Oakes, Jeremy Reid, Tristan Rogers, Jackie Sideris, Joshua Stuchlik, Bjorn Wastvedt,
Jonathan Weinberg, Sean Whitton, and two anonymous reviewers from this journal.
Stoic Virtue
Introduction
Diogenes of Sinope held little hope that there are any truly virtuous people.
He is said to have searched the streets of Athens, carrying a lamp in broad day-
light, claiming he was looking for an honest man. Diogenes claimed that much
of what dominated an Athenian life – social status and material wealth – were
hindrances to virtue, and thus that truly honest or virtuous people were exceed-
ingly rare.2 Surely though Diogenes was far too cynical. We know many honest
people – honest parents, honest bankers, and honest friends – even though there
are social pressures that undermine the virtues. Part of Diogenes’s error seems
to be that he thought a person could not be honest without being completely
honest. Even if Diogenes was right about the obstacles to virtue in daily life,
was he not wrong to think that a person could not be honest without shedding
all such attachments? I will be arguing that there is a way of understanding
Diogenes that can make sense of his seemingly outlandish claim, a way of inter-
preting virtue terms on which there is no one honest or virtuous unless there is
someone who is perfectly so.
The claim that virtue requires perfection, an infamous Stoic doctrine, is
thought to be implausible for a myriad of reasons. To begin with, our ordinary
virtue ascriptions far outpace those of the Stoic. According to Stoicism, only
the perfectly virtuous sage is actually virtuous – everyone else is vicious. As
already mentioned though, our applications of virtue terms are hardly limited
to those who are completely virtuous. We often describe those with small moral
foibles as virtuous, making the Stoic position seem almost absurd. Furthermore,
it is difficult to understand how the Stoic view can make sense of moral progress
and virtue comparisons, further components of our commonsense moral lives.
These three pressing worries for the Stoic conception of virtue – ordinary virtue
ascriptions, virtue comparisons, and moral progress – are all outlined in detail
in Section 1. How, then, can anyone maintain that virtue requires perfection?
In this paper, I will be arguing that it is possible to maintain that virtue
requires perfection by holding that virtue-theoretic terms are absolute gradable
adjectives. Recent work in linguistics has revealed a distinction between relative
and absolute gradable adjectives, categories that, with a few notable exceptions,
were previously conflated. Positing this divergence explains a wide range of lin-
guistic phenomena, cementing the relative/absolute distinction as orthodoxy on
gradable adjectives.3 Unsurprisingly, the contrast between absolute and grad-
able adjectives has been ignored within philosophy as well – a blind spot in need
2See Diogenes Laertius, Vitae Philosophorum 6.41. The more accurate translation of what
Diogenes inquires as he is traveling through the streets is that “he is looking for a man.” The
reason that he cannot find one is that he takes man to be essentially rational. By living apart
from virtue, however, the citizens of Athens are also not living completely rational lives, hence
Diogenes’s criticism that he cannot find a man as he cannot find anyone completely virtuous
and thus rational.
3See Kennedy (2007). The other notable exceptions to the widespread neglect of this
distinction are Kennedy and McNally (2005), Rusiecki (1985), and Unger (1975).
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of remedy. In Section 2, I detail the relative/absolute distinction, outlining the
characteristics that separate relative from absolute gradable adjectives, setting
the stage for arguing that virtue-theoretic terms resemble absolute gradable ad-
jectives.
One crucial difference between relative and absolute gradable adjectives is
how their truth-conditions are determined.. The denotations of relative grad-
able adjectives, including ‘tall’ and ‘expensive,’ shift across context, allowing
that a child who is not considered tall amongst adults can still be considered
tall for their age and that a handbag that is not expensive to the cultural elite is
nonetheless expensive for those in the middle class. When terms like ‘virtuous’
and ‘honest’ are taken to be relative gradable adjectives, the natural result are
accounts on which their truth conditions differ along with the context. This is
problematic for the Stoics, however, because applications of ‘virtuous’ and ‘hon-
est’ then only require meeting the contextually relevant standards. On the other
hand, unlike relative gradable adjectives, the denotation of absolute gradable
adjectives remains fixed on the maximal element in the underlying scale regard-
less of the context. Absolute gradable adjectives are thus not context-sensitive
and always pick out objects that satisfy the top of their scales. Interpreting
virtue terms as absolute gradable adjectives, a task that I attempt in Section
3, thus makes it possible to defend the Stoic view that virtue requires perfection.
Taking virtue-theoretic adjectives to be absolute gradable adjectives not only
helps capture the Stoic view that being virtuous requires being fully virtuous,
as I will in Section 4, it also provides a response to the three primary objections
to Stoic virtue. Absolute gradable adjectives still permit distinctions below the
maximum of their underlying scales, thus providing a route to understanding
virtue comparisons and moral progress. Furthermore, imprecise attributions of
absolute gradable adjectives are often made, but such attributions are literally
false, not true in any context. If virtue terms are absolute gradable adjectives,
then many of our ordinary uses of virtue terms are also imprecise uses, allowing
the Stoics to make sense of ordinary virtue attributions.
The primary goal of this paper then is to argue that, by interpreting virtue
terms as absolute gradable adjectives, there is a route to defending the Stoic
account of virtue. In Section 1, I will lay out the Stoic view, outlining both the
Stoic commitments on virtue as well as some of the most common objections
leveled against it. In Section 2, I will then describe the distinction between
relative and absolute gradable adjectives, noting the tests that are often used to
distinguish them along with the differences in their truth conditions. I will then
argue in Section 3 that it is not implausible to develop the Stoic position by
interpreting virtue-theoretic adjectives as absolute gradable adjectives. To begin
with, the Stoics interpret virtue terms on the linguistic model of ‘straight,’ an
absolute gradable adjective. Furthermore, virtue terms pass many of the tests
attributed with absolute gradable adjectives, providing a case that ‘straight’
and ‘virtuous’ are of the same semantic kind. I then use this observation in
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Section 4 to respond to the critiques of Stoic virtue, arguing that the work on
absolute gradable adjectives provides a route to defending the Stoic view. In
the conclusion, I will consider some of the consequences for virtue ethics if we
not only accept that taking virtue terms to be absolute gradable adjectives is
a promising route to defend Stoicism, but that virtue-theoretic adjectives in
fact are absolute gradable adjectives. On this understanding of virtue terms,
Diogenes is not mistaken about the truth-conditions of virtue terms; he simply
refuses to use ‘honest’ imprecisely.
1 Stoic Virtue
Before we get started, it will be helpful to get clear on a few issues. To begin
with, I do not intend to be offering an historical interpretation of the Stoics.
My goal, rather, is to show how some problems pressed against Stoics can be
met by considering contemporary work in linguistics. As the Stoics were ob-
viously not privy to such developments, this aim prevents me from offering a
strict historical interpretation of the Stoics. What I will be offering instead is
an attempt to make consistent a package of Stoic commitments that the ma-
jority of Stoic scholars have found contradictory. In that sense, this project is
an interpretation of the Stoics. However, since the solution will be framed in
terms of a distinction in contemporary linguistics between relative and absolute
gradable adjectives, the understanding of the Stoics offered in this paper is a
contemporary interpretation. To the extent that I make use of Stoic writings
then, I only take myself to be showing that such moves are consonant with cer-
tain aspects of Stoic thought, not that the Stoics would completely endorse my
solution. Just as I do not intend to offer an exact historical interpretation of the
Stoics, I also do not provide a complete defense of the Stoic view of virtue. My
goal in this paper is just to show that certain Stoic commitments can be made
consistent, not to argue against competing theories of virtue. In the conclusion,
I do explore some of the upshots of my interpretation of the Stoic account of
virtue, but a full defense of the view that the virtues are in fact in accord with
Stoic doctrine will have to be left to further work.4
Another point that is worth keeping in mind is that there is no one such
thing as the Stoic account of virtue – there are instead many individual Stoics
with divergent accounts of the virtuous life. Because there is no one thing that
is the Stoic understanding of virtue, it is not possible to defend the Stoic view
on virtue. For this reason, I will be focusing on aspects of Stoic theorizing about
virtue that have significant overlap across a diverse set of Stoics. In laying out
the Stoic view, then, we will be looking for areas of widespread consensus in
Stoic thought. Once these have been established, I’ll then proceed to develop a
route to embracing these elements of the Stoic account of virtue.
4Thank you to an anonymous reviewer for helping me to get clear about the scope of the
argument of this paper.
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Finally, even though I intend to argue for a detailed Stoic account of virtue,
due to limitations of space, there will be parts of the overlapping Stoic consensus
that I will not be able to defend. This paper unfortunately cannot encompass
all of Stoic theorizing – that virtue is the only good or that virtue is completely
an internal affair – but nevertheless aims to argue for a set of Stoic claims that
are especially contentious. In order to avoid confusion, in this section I will
outline the elements of Stoic virtue that will be pertinent for this paper, later
offering a single solution that can be used to secure all of these claims. Our first
task, then, is to lay out aspects of Stoic virtue that I will offer a strategy for
defending.
1.1 Virtue and Vice
The first element of Stoic virtue that this paper will focus on is the thought that
virtue requires moral perfection. On the Stoic view, only the perfectly virtuous
sage can truly be described as virtuous. Virtue is so lofty that a person who
attains it is on par with the gods. Cicero contends that, on the Stoic view,
“Virtue in man and God is the same... For virtue is nothing else than nature
perfect and brought to a summit: it is, therefore, a point of similarity between
man and God,”5 while of the sage Dion, Plutarch says, “Zeus does not exceed
Dion in virtue.”6 For this reason, ancient commentators describe the virtuous
person as being “rarer than the Ethiopian phoenix.”7 Cicero goes so far as to
say that “It happens more often that a mule begets than that a sage comes
into existence.”8 Modern commentators have upheld this reading of the Stoics,
taking ‘virtuous’ to truly apply only to the perfectly virtuous.9 There is thus a
wide consensus that the Stoics endorsed Perfect Virtue:
(1) Perfect Virtue – Only the perfectly virtuous are truly virtuous
For the Stoics, the perfectly virtuous person is identified with the sage, of which
there have been very few in history. The average person falls below moral per-
fection, and thus cannot be truly described as virtuous. Thus, the Stoics take
a quite contentious stance with Perfect Virtue, contending very few people
have ever been actually virtuous.
The difficulty of the Stoic position does not stop, however, with arguing that
only the perfectly virtuous are considered virtuous. The challenge only deepens
with the Stoics drawing a strict line between virtue and vice. According to the
Stoics, “nothing is between virtue and vice,”10 a point that they drive home
5See De legibus 1.25 (SVF 1.564). Where possible, the location of these excerpts has been
given both in H. von Armin’s Stoicim veterum fragmenta (SVF) and A.A. Long and D.N.
Sedley’s The Hellenistic Philosophers (LS).
6See De communibus notitiis 1076A (SVF 3.246, LS 61J).
7See Alexander of Aphrodisias, De fato 199.16-18 (SVF 3.568, LS 61N) .
8See De divinatione 2.61.
9See Becker (1998), pp. 119-126, Brouwer (2014), ch. 3, Jedan (2011), ch. 4, Long (1986),
pp. 204-205, Sandbach (1975), p. 28, and Zeller (1880), pp. 266-270.
10See Diogenes Laertius, Vitae Philosophorum, 7.127 (SVF 3.40, LS 61I).
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with a number of metaphors. One common analogy is to describe the vicious
person as drowning, something that can happen whether they are close to the
surface or far below the waves, making it irrelevant how close they are to being
virtuous: [The Stoics] say, “but just as in the sea the man an arm’s length
from the surface is drowning no less than the one who has sunk five hundred
fathoms, so even those who are getting close to virtue are no less in a state of
vice than those who are far from it.” 11 Cicero compares being in a state of vice
to being blind, saying that just as “a puppy on the point of opening its eyes
is no less blind than one just born,” likewise the person about to attain virtue
remains vicious.12 Similarly, Chrysippus argues that those who are closer to
virtue are nevertheless vicious, as the traveler who “is a hundred furlongs from
Canopus, and the man who is only one, are both equally not in Canopus.”13 It is
thus generally agreed that, in addition to Perfect Virtue, the Stoics endorsed
Bivalence:14
(2) Bivalence – Everyone is either virtuous or vicious
With Bivalence, the Stoics held that there is no one that is not either virtuous
or vicious. There are no vague cases – anyone who is not virtuous is vicious.
When we combine Bivalence with Perfect Virtue though, it follows that
everyone who is not perfectly virtuous is vicious. If it was counterintuitive to
accept Perfect Virtue, then even more so the combination of the two. Not only
are the Stoics committed to the rarity of the sage, but they are also committed
to thinking that almost everyone who has ever lived is vicious.
1.2 Concerns about Stoic Virtue
The combination of Perfect Virtue and Bivalence might seem to make the
Stoic position on virtue practically a non-starter.15 Should we really think that
almost everyone is vicious? Critics of the Stoic account of virtue have pressed
a number of objections that are thought to conclusively show that the Stoic
rhetoric about virtue was just that, rhetoric. The first of these considerations
is that the Stoic account of virtue is too demanding. Must a person really be
perfectly virtuous in order to be virtuous at all? Such a requirement seems quite
unrealistic. After all, most of us know several people we would call virtuous –
virtuous parents, virtuous mentors, and virtuous friends – and thus it appears
that the Stoic view cannot make sense of many of our applications of ‘virtuous.’
Even though these people are not perfectly virtuous, it is nevertheless seems
fitting to call them virtuous. The first problem, then, with the Stoic view is
that it does not seem to permit that ordinary people are virtuous even though
11See Plutarch, De communibus notitiis 1063A-B (SVF 3.539, LS 61T).
12See De Finibus 3.48 (SVF 3.530) .
13See Diogenes Laertius, Vitae Philosophorum, 7.120 (SVF 3.527).
14Contemporary commentators who attribute Bivalence to the Stoics include Becker
(1998), p. 119, Brouwer (2014), ch. 3, Sandbach (1975), p. 28, Sellars (2003), p. 61,
and Sharples (2014), p. 106.
15Geert Roskam (2005) says rhetorically, “No doubt this view should not be taken seriously”
(p. 15.).
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it seems completely appropriate to describe them as such, a fact captured by
Ordinary Virtue:
(3) Ordinary Virtue – It is appropriate to describe ordinary people who
are not completely virtuous as virtuous
The Stoic view appears to be clearly out of step with Ordinary Virtue. If
hardly anyone is actually virtuous, then why would it be appropriate to call our
friends and neighbors virtuous? The Stoic account seems clearly lacking in that
it fails to capture this fact about our virtue talk.
One way to make sense of Ordinary Virtue is to argue that being truly
virtuous does not demand being perfectly virtuous. Contra the Stoics, being
virtuous could instead require something like being virtuous enough. Christine
Swanton provides just such an account, giving the following analysis of virtue:
“A virtue is a good quality of character, more specifically a disposition to
respond to, or acknowledge, items within its field or fields in an excellent
or good enough way.”16
According to Swanton, whether or not the Athenian is virtuous depends not
on whether they are fully in accord with virtue but whether they are doing
good enough given their situation. Dan Russell agrees, contending that being
virtuous enough is sufficient for being virtuous:
“It seems undeniable that being virtuous enough is a sufficient condition
for being virtuous tout court – not perfectly virtuous or even virtuous
without qualification, but nonetheless virtuous in a genuine, bona fide
sense.”17
On Dan Russell’s account, being virtuous enough in a given situation is suffi-
cient to be considered virtuous full stop – it is not required that a person be
perfectly virtuous to be called virtuous. Thus, on Swanton’s and Russell’s ac-
counts, even if perfect virtue is unattainable, we can still make sense of why
Ordinary Virtue is true – we call our parents and friends virtuous because
they are in fact virtuous.
Another criticism of the Stoic conception of virtue is that it cannot account
for degrees of virtue. It is obvious that one person can be more virtuous than
another even if neither are perfectly virtuous, but the strict Stoic doctrine that
only the completely virtuous are virtuous while the rest are vicious is too coarse-
grained to capture this distinction, or so the charge goes. Julia Annas formulates
this objection to the Stoic view of virtue as follows:
[Being less than fully virtuous] would be troubling if we insisted on a
rigorist approach, such that a person either is virtuous or is not virtuous
16See Swanton (2003), p. 19.
17See Russell (2009), p. 112.
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at all. This would have the result that only the fully virtuous person
is virtuous, while none of us are virtuous at all. This is in fact the
Stoic position, but it is a very awkward one, since it strictly allows for
no difference between the mediocre non-virtuous and the horrendously
vicious non-virtuous.18
On Annas’s interpretation, Stoics cannot distinguish between the moderately
and the extremely vicious. Anything that falls short of perfect virtue is vice,
making the Stoic view incapable of making finer-grained judgments about the
level of virtue and vice in each person. For this reason, Stoics are saddled with
judging that the occasionally dishonest are just as bad as pathological liars,
labeling both simply as falling short of the virtue of honesty. This view, Annas
says, “allows for no difference between the mediocre non-virtuous and the hor-
rendously vicious non-virtuous,” making the Stoic opinion quite out of keeping
with commonsense notions of virtue.
Lawrence Becker takes the same perspective, arguing that the Stoic take on
virtue is powerless to say that anyone who falls short of virtue is more virtuous
than another. On Becker’s understanding, because virtue is an all-or-nothing
affair, ordinary citizens are just as vicious as serial killers:
Virtue is the only good, and it is an all-or-nothing affair. No one who
falls short of being a sage has any trait that can be called good at all, nor
can one such person be any better or more virtuous than another. There
are sages, and then there are the rest of us. Sages are equally virtuous;
the rest of us (serial killers and mild-mannered reporters, mass murderers
and their innocent victims) are all equally vicious.19
Becker argues that, because the Stoics endorse a strict reading of virtue that
labels only the sage as virtuous, it is not possible to draw any distinctions
between non-sages. All are equally vicious. If this is right though, then surely
the Stoics were mistaken about virtue. Everyday people are more virtuous than
mass murderers, so much the worse for any theory of virtue that says otherwise.
Let’s call this fact about virtue that Stoicism fails to capture Comparative
Virtue:
(4) Comparative Virtue – For two persons that both fall short of per-
fect virtue, it is possible for one of them to be more virtuous than the
other
Like with Annas’s criticism, Comparative Virtue is an indictment of Stoic
virtue for failing to capture the range of virtue ascriptions that we make. We
can and do say that there are ordinary folks who are more or less virtuous, and
insofar as the Stoic doctrine cannot make sense of this, it fails to capture our
standard concept of virtue.
18See Annas (2011), p. 65.
19See Becker (1998), p. 118.
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The final criticism of Stoic virtue that we will look at is that it cannot
account for moral progress. By the Stoic’s own lights, moral progress is possible.
Plutarch and Stobaeus both attest to the Stoic endorsement of the man who
makes moral progress, the prokopton.20 According to Cicero, Cato the Younger
characterizes the prokopton as advancing through five distinct moral stages,
the final step being the one that takes the prokopton from vice to virtue.21
The Stoics, then, believe in the potential of Moral Progress, even when a
particular prokopton has not yet become morally perfect:
(5) Moral Progress – It is possible to make moral progress without
becoming perfectly virtuous
The difficulty with Moral Progress, however, is how to conceptually locate its
possibility within the Stoic framework. If all non-sages are vicious, how can we
describe the movement towards virtue?
Many commentators maintain that the prokopton endorsed by the Stoics is
ultimately paradoxical. Dirk Baltzly, for instance, says that the Stoics cannot
be literally interpreted as endorsing Moral Progress:
“Strictly speaking, there is no such thing as moral progress for the Stoics
(if that means progress within morality), and they give the charming
illustration of drowning to make their point: a person an arm’s length
from the surface is drowning every bit as surely as one who is five hundred
fathoms down.”22
On Baltzly’s reading, the Stoics should not be thought of as arguing for progress
in virtue since there is no such thing – anyone who is not virtuous is vicious.
F. H. Sandbach agrees, concluding that the Stoics could not seriously have
endorsed Moral Progress since it creates a paradox with their other views:
“Although the Stoics defended the paradox, it may be doubted whether
they took it very seriously. Perhaps a more effective encouragement to
effort was provided by the figure of the man ‘making an advance’ (prokop-
ton), still involved in the waters of wickedness, but making his way toward
the surface. Critics claimed that he was inconsistent with the paradox,
and to common sense he is.”23
Sandbach’s understanding is that taking someone to grow in virtue, moving
his way towards the water’s surface, was not conceivable on the Stoic view.
Using such language may have helped the cause of virtue, since it might have
encouraged people to make moral progress, but Sandbach doubts that this can
be made compatible with the other Stoic commitments.
20See Plutarch, De Profectibus in Virtue 75C (SVF 3.539, LS 61S) and Stobaeus, Flori-
legium 4.22 (SVF 3.510).
21See De Finibus 3.20 (SVF 3.188, LS 59D).
22See Baltzly (2019).
23See Sandbach (1975), p. 45. Other commentators that take issue with Moral Progress
include Roskam (2005), pp. 23-25.
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2 Gradable Adjectives: Relative and Absolute
We can now see that the burden of proof that is on the defender of Stoic virtue
as the advocate of the Stoic account of virtue must find a way to capture (1)-
(5). One way to make sense of (1)-(5) would be to say that only some of these
claims are true and offer an error theory for the remainder. Such an account
might endorse Perfect Virtue, Bivalence, and Moral Progress, for instance,
and explain why we mistakenly believe Ordinary Virtue and Comparative
Virtue. An even stronger response, however, would be to propose a strategy
that vindicates all of (1)-(5), showing that Stoic virtue has nothing to fear
from the stock objections offered by Stoic critics. This latter response is what
I will aim for in this paper. I will argue that understanding virtue terms as
absolute gradable adjectives allows the Stoic interpreter to accept (1)-(5) as
true, making Stoic virtue capable of answering its most pressing objections.
However, before I make the case that virtue-theoretic adjectives are plausibly
thought to be absolute gradable adjectives, I must first introduce the distinction
between relative and absolute gradable adjectives.
2.1 Relative Gradable Adjectives
The orthodox view of gradable adjectives is that they come in two varieties,
relative gradable adjectives and absolute gradable adjectives, henceforth RAs
and AAs.24 Relative gradable adjectives, adjectives like ‘tall,’ ‘large,’ ‘long,’ and
‘expensive,’ are characterized by an underlying degree scale on which objects in
the domain fall.25 Because this scale imposes an ordering, uses of comparative
constructions are then true and false depending on whether they mirror this
underlying structure. For example, (6) is true just in case John has a greater
degree of height than Harry:
(6) John is taller than Harry.
This ordering, however, is not all that goes into determining whether (7) is true:
(7) John is tall.
The truth of (7) also depends on a threshold on the underlying scale. If the
degree of John’s height is clearly greater than the threshold, then (7) is true,
24This distinction is due to Kennedy (2007), Kennedy and McNally (2005), Rusiecki (1985),
and Unger (1975). The characteristics of absolute gradable adjectives have also been studied
by Rotstein and Winter (2004), though their focus was on the distinction between partial and
total gradable adjectives.
25Though the scale approach of Cresswell (1977), Heim (2000), Kennedy (2007), and von
Stechow (1984) has been the most influential, the primary competitor is a view on which the
extension of a gradable adjective displays contextual shifts with the basis for comparatives
being quantifications over possible precisifications of the adjective’s extension, a view whose
development runs through Fine (1975), Kamp (1975), Klein (1980), Larson (1988), and Pinkal
(1995). The scale view holds a distinct advantage though in explaining the distinction between
relative and absolute adjectives (Kennedy, 2007).
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and if the degree of his height is clearly lower, then (7) is false.26 As previously
mentioned, the threshold in question is contextually determined. The degree of
height which a primary school child must possess to be considered tall is much
lower than the degree that a basketball player must possess.
The contextual thresholds of RAs can be adjusted to differentiate between
most individuals that differ to some degree on the underlying scale.27 In a
selection task with two heaps of sand, (8) is felicitous even if the piles of sand
are not particularly tall, so long as one is taller than the other:
(8) Point to the tall one.
RAs thus have an accommodating contextual threshold in that it can be adjusted
to differentiate between most points on the underlying degree scale. Relative
gradable adjectives lose this feature, however, at the extreme ends of the scale.
If I am at a professional basketball game looking at two players well above seven
feet, or at a national park admiring two very tall redwoods, (8) is infelicitous.
This infelicity demonstrates that, though RAs can be used to distinguish be-
tween objects that fall in the middle of their degree scales, their contextual
thresholds cannot always be adjusted to differentiate between objects that fall
on the extreme ends of the degree scale.
Another feature of relative gradable adjectives is that they always give rise
to Sorites paradoxes. With ‘tall,’ the paradox gets going with (9):
(9) For whatever height you are, one inch of height does not change
whether you are tall or not.
The trouble of course is created by the fact that (9) seems true. This can be
explained by the fact that RAs cannot be used to pick out a maximally specific
degree on the underlying scale. As previously noted, an object falls with the
extension of an RA like ‘tall’ if it possesses a degree of height that is clearly
greater than the relevant threshold, a description meant to accommodate for
borderline cases. Even though there are basketball players who are obviously
tall and others who are not, there are others that it is unclear whether they
should be classified as tall or short, and may even seem right to say that they
are neither. This vagueness makes it such that (9) is intuitively correct, leading
to the Sorites.28
26With talk of degrees that are clearly lower or higher than the relevant threshold, I am
following Rotstein and Winter (2004), Kennedy (2007), and Kennedy and McNally (2005) in
holding that the extension of a relative gradable adjective includes those items that “stand
out” relative to the contextual threshold in order to accommodate the possibility of borderline
cases. The view that relative gradable adjectives have a contextual threshold, however, has
a much longer history. See Barker (2002), Bartsch and Vennemann (1972), Bierwisch (1989),
Cresswell (1977), Fine (1975), Kamp (1975), Klein (1980), Lewis (1970), Pinkal (1995), Sapir
(1944), von Stechow (1984), and Wheeler (1972).
27See Kennedy (2007), Kyburg and Morreau (2000), Sedivy et al. (1999), and Syrett et al.
(2006 and 2010).
28For evaluations of what types of semantic accounts of gradable adjectives can diagnose
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2.2 Absolute Gradable Adjectives: Total and Partial
Absolute gradable adjectives include ‘dry,’ ‘straight,’ ‘pure,’ and ‘empty.’ Like
relative gradable adjectives, absolute gradable adjectives can be used in com-
paratives. Every eligible object in the domain is assigned a certain degree on
the underlying scale, making (10) true so long as the mug is filled to a greater
degree than the cup:
(10) The cup is emptier than the mug.
Furthermore, just as with RAs, this degree scale is not all that goes into deter-
mining whether (11) is true:
(11) The cup is empty.
The accuracy of (11) depends on whether the fullness of the cup falls within a
certain range. Unlike with RAs, however, this range cannot be characterized as
a contextual threshold that can be adjusted simply by distinguishing between
two points on the degree scale. Supposing that the mug is three quarters full and
the cup only halfway, (10) is still true, but the following command is infelicitious:
(12) #Point to the empty one.
AAs thus do not have thresholds that are contextually accommodating as do
RAs.29
The infelicity of (12) in the above case may seem analogous to the case of
the tall basketball players or the tall redwoods. Why not say that, just like with
RAs, there are parts of the scale that a contextual threshold cannot distinguish
between? What separates the infelicity of (8) from the infelicity of (12) is that,
in the former case, the infelicity occurs with two objects that are at the scale’s
extreme, while in the latter case, the infelicity occurs with objects in the middle
of the scale. The cups are three quarters and half full, whereas both basketball
players, and both trees, are very tall. This asymmetry is reinforced by the fact
that, while RAs cannot be used to differentiate between objects on the extreme
end of a scale, AAs can. Consider, for instance, a cup that is completely empty
and a mug that has a swallow of liquid left. In such a case, both (10) and (12)
are felicitous. RAs and AAs thus differ in the following way – RAs can be used
to distinguish between objects in the middle of a scale but not at the scale’s
extreme, while uses of AAs cannot distinguish between objects in the middle of
the scale, but can at the end of the scale.
Because absolute gradable adjectives do not possess a threshold that is con-
textually flexible in the same way as relative gradable adjectives, there are cases
in which they do not give rise to Sorites paradoxes. If the cup has exactly one
the existence of borderline cases and the Sorites paradox, see Graff Fara (2000), Kennedy
(2007), Pinkal (1995), and Rusiecki (1985).
29See Kennedy (2007), Kyburg and Morreau (2000), Sedivy et al. (1999), and Syrett et al.
(2006 and 2010).
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ounce of liquid in it and is for that reason not empty, there is no temptation to
accept a sentence like (13), which is essential for the paradox to get started:
(13) For however full a container is, one ounce of liquid does not change
whether it is empty or not.
If the cup has exactly one ounce of liquid in it, taking away that ounce of water
makes it true that the cup is empty, making (13), the first step along the route
to the paradoxical result, clearly false. This is because there is a clear cutoff
point for the distinction between empty and not empty. With ‘tall,’ it is not
clear at what point adding one inch of height will take someone from not being
tall to being tall, but in the case of the empty glass, it is clear when taking away
another ounce of liquid will make it empty.30
Absolute gradable adjectives come in two forms – total and partial. Total
AAs require the absence of a particular property. A dry table is not wet to
any degree, a straight line is not at all bent, and pure gold does not contain
any impurities. The truth of partial AAs, on the other hand, requires only that
objects possess a minimal degree of the property described. A table is wet if it
has even a small degree of wetness, a line is bent if it is just under one hundred
and eighty degrees, and gold is impure if it contains some amount of impurity.31
AAs often come in pairs – wet and dry, bent and straight, impure and pure,
open and closed – with one of the pairs behaving as a total AA and the other
a partial AA. This is the case so long as the AAs in question are contradicto-
ries. ‘Wet,’ for instance, is synonymous with ‘not dry,’ and ‘dry’ with ‘not wet,’
yielding the result that ‘wet’ and ‘dry’ are a total/partial pair. ‘Empty’ and
‘full,’ on the other hand, are not contradictories in that ‘empty’ does not simply
mean ‘not full,’ so ‘empty’ and ‘full’ do not form a total/partial pair. ‘Empty’
and ‘full’ are, in fact, both total AAs, as both can create failures in the “point
to” selection test.
Even though many uses of total AAs requires the absence of a particular
property, it is possible to create a context in which approximations are also
considered to satisfy sentences attributing total AAs. It can be acceptable to
say that a table is dry even if is slightly damp when the purpose is to cover the
table with a tablecloth that you do not want to get soaking wet. Similarly, it
can be acceptable to say that a glass is full even if it could be slightly more full
than it is. Total AAs can thus give rise to Sorites paradoxes in such contexts.
Does adding one more drop of water change whether the table is dry or not?
Does taking away a drop of water prevent the cup from being full? Negations
of partial AAs exhibit the same characteristic, as ‘not bent,’ ‘not wet,’ and ‘not
30The fact that Sorites-paradoxical results disappear in some cases with AAs has been noted
by Burnett (2014), Kennedy (2007), and Pinkal (1995).
31For more on the distinction between total and partial absolute adjectives, see Burnett
(2014), Cruse (1986), Kennedy (2007), Rotstein and Winter (2004), and Yoon (1996). Kamp
and Rossdeutscher (1994) entertain the distinction as well, but under the description of a
distinction between universal and existential adjectives.
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impure’ behave like total AAs. Absolute gradable adjectives that do not give
rise to the Sorites in any context are partial AAs and the negations of total
AAs. Because partial AAs require that an object possess a minimal degree of
the property in question, objects that possess none of the property will then
falsify the crucial premise of the Sorites:
(14) For however wet a table is, taking away one drop of water will not
make it dry.
If there is only a single drop of water on the table, then (14) will be false of
that table. Likewise, since negations of total AAs are synonymous with partial
AAs, negations of total AAs also do not give rise to Sorites Paradoxes.32 The
lack of Sorites-paradoxical results for partial AAs and negations of total AAs is
associated with the presence of a top-closed or bottom-closed scale. A table can
be maximally dry, and thus ‘wet’ does not give rise to a Sorites march, whereas,
for the RA ‘tall,’ it is not possible to be maximally tall. For however tall you
are, it is always possible to possess a degree more height. Because ‘tall’ has an
open scale, ‘not tall’ gives way to the Sorites just as easily as ‘tall’ does.
2.3 Vagueness and Imprecision
How should we characterize the contextual variation allowed by AAs? Why
under some circumstances can the use of an AA still lead to a Sorites paradox?
The difference between the contextual variation in RAs and AAs is best un-
derstood as the distinction between vagueness and imprecision.33 The guiding
thought with imprecision is that a particular point plays a central role in the
meaning of the term used. For instance, if it is said that Mary arrived at three
o’clock, the precise time three o’clock plays a crucial role in the meaning of the
sentence. Such a statement could be made imprecisely, if Mary arrived at 2:58
or 3:02, for instance, but this does not undermine the thought that precisely 3:00
constrains the meaning of the assertion. With gradable adjectives, the maximal
or minimal points on the scale play a central role in the meaning of AAs. A glass
that is completely full counts as full in any context, but when the standards of
‘full’ are relaxed, this is not due to a contextually determined threshold, as with
RAs, but merely imprecise uses of ‘full,’ a term which depends for its meaning
on maximal fullness. When the standards are thus relaxed and a degree or so
below complete fullness counts as full, then it is unclear at what lesser degree
of fullness a glass stops counting as full due to the imprecision.
A test to distinguish between vague and imprecise predicates is whether
the gradable adjective in question allows for natural precisification. The mean-
ings of vague terms can only be precisified by introducing stipulative definitions,
32For more on the Sorites and absolute gradable adjectives, see Burnett (2014) and Kennedy
(2007).
33For more on the distinction generally, see Krifka (2002 and 2007), Lakoff (1973), Sadock
(1977), and Sauerland and Stateva (2007). For the distinction as it relates to absolute gradable
adjectives, see Pinkal (1995) and Kennedy (2007).
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whereas with imprecise terms, natural language contexts can independently pre-
cisify the term. With imprecise AAs, contexts can be established in which only
the maximal degree satisfies the standards. Even though a sports stadium can be
described as empty on a day of low attendance, nothing but complete emptiness
will be under consideration when a construction boss overseeing the demolition
of the stadium inquires whether it is empty. It is also possible to eliminate bor-
derline cases from consideration. Twenty-two karat gold only permits impurities
to eight percent, but a jeweler may establish a higher standard for pure’ with a
use of (15):
(15) The gold for the rings needs to be pure, but this gold is twenty-two
karat, so it will not do.
Similarly, if a surface is being used for an experiment and needs to be so dry
that it has no water molecules on it at all, a scientist can use ‘dry’ to pick out
this property:
(16) The table needs to be dry, but the surface still has a few stray water
molecules, so it will not do.
Vague RAs, however, allow no such precifications. Not only do RAs not have
closed scales, thus not allowing for precisification to a maximal or minimal
degree, but strict cutoffs cannot be created either. The world record height for
a redwood tree is 380 feet. A forester that is looking for tall trees cannot create
a cutoff for ‘tall’ by a use of (17):
(17) #I’m looking for tall redwoods, but this one is 375 feet tall so it will
not do.
Thus, RAs cannot be naturally precisified, while AAs can, securing that uses of
RAs can be vague while uses AAs can be imprecise.
The fact that AAs accept natural precisification and RAs do not can also be
demonstrated by answers to queries. If before the demolition of the stadium,
the construction foreman asks the owner of the stadium whether it is empty,
the owner is untruthful if they say (18) when there is only one person left in the
stadium:
(18) The stadium is empty.
For the purposes of demolition, only a completely empty stadium will do, and
therefore ‘empty’ is precisified to mean no people whatsoever. The same cannot,
however, occur with an RA like ‘tall.’ Suppose that a record-hunter heads to the
national park looking for a record-setting redwood. Even though the park does
not have any trees over 380 feet, the forester cannot for this reason truthfully
say (19):
(19) The park does not have any tall redwoods
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Even though the purpose of the conversation is finding a record-setting red-
wood, this does not precisify the meaning of ‘tall’ up to any redwoods that are
record-setting. The key difference then between vague and imprecise adjectives
is that imprecise adjectives can be made more precise, possibly even establishing
strict cutoffs, while vague adjectives cannot.
Assaf Toledo and Galit Sassoon argue that the orthodox view is wrong to
think that absolute gradable adjectives are used imprecisely. They present con-
trasts of total AAs that they claim tell against the standard account:
(20) This kitchen knife is clean.
(21)This surgical instrument is clean.
(22) This child’s shirt is dirty.
(23)This tuxedo is dirty.
If total AAs are used to picked out the maximal element on the underlying
scale, then why are uses of (20) and (22) acceptable in cases of cleanliness and
dirtiness that are less stringent than is required for uses of (21) and (23)? This
extends to other examples as well – why do we not hesitate, for instance, to say
wine glasses are full when they are only filled halfway?34 According to Toledo
and Sassoon, such cases show that the interpretation of AAs cannot just depend
on the maximal element in the scale. Rather, other factors must be considered
as well, like the type of object of which they are being ascribed, generating
shifting standards when applied to kitchen knives and surgical instruments.
Despite the contentions of Toledo and Sassoon, these examples do not show
that the standard view is inadequate. All of their examples can be predicted by
the orthodox account as acceptable imprecise uses. Imprecise uses are acceptable
whenever the property they pick out is good enough for the practical purposes at
hand. In the case of kitchen knives and surgical instruments, the characteristic
use of the latter requires much more so far as cleanliness is concerned, so the
standards for uses of (21) are more demanding than uses of (20). Likewise,
tuxedo’s are worn in circumstances where being spotlessly clean is the norm,
so acceptable uses of (23) require less dirt than those of (22). What about
wine glasses? The standard view predicts that if it is permissible to ascribe
fullness to a wine glass when it is not maximally full, this is because there
is some practical goal that can be satisfied by wine glasses that are less than
completely full. This prediction is confirmed – amongst wine connoiseurs it is
common knowledge that a wine glass is only filled halfway in order to allow
the wine to be properly aerated, the same purpose for which wine decanters
are used. Having room to swirl the glass allows the aroma of the wine to be
released.35 Thus, there is a practical purpose at play when half full wine glasses
are described as full, allowing such data to be captured by the orthodox account.
34See Toledo and Sassoon (2011). They borrow the wine glass example from McNally (2011).
35See Fox (2011) and McCarthy and Mulligan (2015).
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3 The Stoics and Absolute Gradable Adjectives
The distinction between relative and absolute gradable adjectives can help us
make headway on how to understand the Stoic claims about virtue. In par-
ticular, by taking virtue-theoretic terms to be absolute gradable adjectives, we
can offer a perspective that secures the truth of (1)-(5). This is not to say that
this is how any particular Stoic author would have responded to these issues
– as previously stated, this paper is not meant to be an historical reconstruc-
tion of the Stoic position. Rather, my aim will be to show that understanding
virtue terms as AAs is consonant with many Stoic commitments and that it can
respond to some of Stoicism’s most serious criticisms.
3.1 Simplicius on Tenors and Characters
The first connection that suggests virtue terms should be interpreted as absolute
gradable adjectives is the Stoic claim that the virtues ought to be thought of as
‘characters’ (diathesis) rather than ‘tenors’ (hexis).36 Aristotle took the virtues
to be tenors,37 but the consensus is that Stoics chose instead to conceptualize
the virtues differently, equating them with characters. This is the terminology
that both Plutarch and Diogenes use in characterizing the Stoic position:
Plutarch – All these [Stoics, Menedemus of Eretria, Aristo of Chios,
Zeno of Citium, and Chrysippus] agree in taking virtue to be a certain
character (diathesis) and power of the soul’s commanding-faculty38
Diogenes Laertius – Virtue is a consistent character (diathesis), choice-
worthy for its own sake and not from fear or hope or anything external39
Not only do both Plutarch and Diogenes Laertius summarize the Stoic position
by saying that virtues are a sort of character (diathesis), but Simplicius argues
that this choice was motivated by the Stoic account of virtue. In his commen-
tary on Aristotle’s Categories, Simplicius distinguishes between tenors (hexis)
and characters (diathesis), arguing that the Stoics understood the virtues as
characters due to their lack of gradability:
[The Stoics] say that tenors (hexis) can be intensified and relaxed, but
characters (diathesis) are not susceptible to intensification or relaxation.
So they call the straightness of a stick a character, even though it is
easily alterable since it can be bent. For the straightness could not be
relaxed or intensified, nor does it admit of more or less, and so it is a
character. For the same reason the virtues are characters, not because of
36Sedley and Long translate diathesis as ‘character’ and hexis as ‘tenor,’ whereas Barry
Fleet’s (2002) translation of Simplicius renders diathesis as ‘condition’ and hexis as ‘state.’
Because the Long and Sedley translation is used most often, I will stick with the language of
tenors and characters.
37See Nicomachean Ethics 1105b25-26.
38See De Virtute Morali 440E-441D (LS 61B).
39See Vitae Philosophorum 7.89 (SVF 3.39, LS 61A).
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their stable feature but because they are not susceptible to intensification
or increase.40
For the Stoics, characters are states that are non-scalar, either a character can
be attributed to an object or it cannot. The model is that of straightness – a
rod is either straight or bent, there is no in between. Diogenes Laertius also
attributes the model of straightness to the Stoics: “For as [the Stoics] say, a
stick must be either straight or crooked, so a man must be either just or unjust,
but not either more just or more unjust, and likewise with the other virtues.”41
The virtues then are also characters.42 Just like a stick is either straight or
bent, a person is a person is either virtuous or vicious. The Stoics thus rejected
the Aristotelian view that the virtues are tenors, classifying them instead as
characters.43
3.2 Virtues as Absolute Gradable Adjectives
For our purposes, Simplicius and Diogenes Laertius picked an apt comparison
– we have already seen that ‘straight’ is an absolute gradable adjective, and so
it makes sense to use this example to distinguish between hexis and diathesis.
As it turns out, the distinction between tenors and characters maps onto the
distinction between RAs and AAs. In both cases, the difference is that the latter
possesses an importantly non-scalar component.44 The Stoics chosen linguistic
model for virtues, ‘straight,’ is clearly an AA. Given the similarity between
characters and properties picked out by AAs, is it possible to also interpret virtue
terms as absolute gradable adjectives? We can begin by observing that virtue-
theoretic adjectives, including the generic ‘virtuous’ along with the more specific
40See Simplicius, On Aristotle’s Categories 237.25-238.20 (SVF 2.393, LS 47S). For more
on the Stoic choice to take virtues as tenors (diathesis), See Jedan (2011), pp. 59-60, and Rist
(1977), p. 3.
41See Vitae Philosophorum, 7.127 (SVF 3.40, LS 61I).
42The Stoic rejection of the virtues as hexis also might have been due to a slightly different
understanding of these terms than Aristotle. Simplicius (238.2-238.32) notes that the Stoics
applied hexis to a number of concepts that Aristotle would have characterized as diathesis,
introducing the possibility that Aristotle and the Stoics diverged on the precise meanings of
these terms. What is important for the current interpretation of the Stoics though is how
they understood the contrast between hexis and diathesis, even if this is not a view shared by
Aristotle.
43One potential difficulty with this understanding of the Stoics is Stobaeus’s position that
the virtues are tenors (hexis), a view he articulates both explicitly (SVF 3.104, LS 60L) and
by arguing that virtue can be characterized as episteme (SVF 3.280, LS 61D) combined with
taking episteme to be a hexis (SVF 3.112, LS 41H). Long and Sedley (1987) recognize this
difficulty, arguing that general tenors must be differentiated from mere tenors. The former is
just any kind of state, a genus of which characters is a species. On this general understanding
of tenor, character is a type of tenor but one that does not admit of degrees. The latter
classification, mere tenors, applies to states that do admit of degrees (p. 376). As applied to
the challenge in interpreting Stobaeus, both virtue and episteme can be general tenors without
contradicting the view that the virtues are also characters, but the virtues are not mere tenors.
Thank you to an anonymous reviewer for encouraging me to address these textual difficulties
in Stobaeus.
44Just as AAs are a species of gradable adjectives, Sedley and Long (1987) classify tenors
as a species of enduring state (p. 376).
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‘honest’ and ‘courageous,’ are clearly gradable. They function felicitously both
in comparatives and with degree modifiers:
(24) Mary is more virtuous/honest/courageous than John
(25) Mary is very virtuous/honest/courageous, the most virtuous/honest/courageous
person I know
Virtue terms are obviously gradable adjectives, but a gradable adjectives of what
stripe? Absolute or relative? Total or partial? Can virtue terms be modeled
on an absolute gradable adjective like ‘straight,’ or are is their behavior rather
more similar to a relative gradable adjective like ‘tall’?
It is helpful here to note that virtue-theoretic adjectives modify a wide range
of object types. Our discussion will focus on persons and actions, the relevant
objects of appraisal within ethics. In both cases, virtue-theoretic adjectives
function like total AAs in “point to” tests, both in the middle of and at the
extremes of the underlying scales. Tests with objects in the middle of the
underlying scale do not allow differentiation. If John has lied three times today
and Mary only two, even though an honesty comparative like (24) is acceptable,
the following command is infelicitous:
(26) #Point to the honest/virtuous person
Tests at the extreme end of the scale, however, do allow such distinctions. Con-
sider if Mary has told no lies and John one. Not only is the honesty comparative
(24) felicitous in such a scenario, but the command (26) is as well. The same
holds true for assessments of actions. If John hid in his foxhole but Mary man-
aged to will herself out of the trench, a use of (27) is true. However, if Mary
subsequently cowers at the gate of the enemy stronghold, despite the fact that
she is more courageous, (28) is infelicitous:
(27) Mary’s action was more courageous than John’s
(28) #Point to the person whose war effort was courageous
Had Mary stormed the gates though, not only would (27) have been true, but
(28) would have been an acceptable request as well. Virtue-theoretic terms thus
display the same asymmetry that total AAs do with RAs in that they cannot
be used to distinguish objects in the middle of the scale but can be used to do
so at the scale’s extreme.
Because the scale of virtue has a maximal element, uses of virtue-theoretic
adjectives also do not always create Sorites marches. For example, (29) is clearly
false when considering the difference between telling one lie or none at all:
(29) For however dishonest a person is, telling one less lie will not make
them honest
It is possible that, for a person who has told one lie, having told one less lie will
make them honest. An important issue to note is that being an honest person,
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and a virtuous person more generally, is not just grounded in particular actions.
Virtues are dispositions, and as such, they can fail to manifest due to the absence
of triggering conditions or be masked when such conditions obtain. A dishonest
person can therefore have told no lies at all due to their unmanifested disposition
to be dishonest. On this understanding, then it is no surprise that (29) comes
out false. In this case, it is not false because virtue terms do not always lead to
the Sorites, but because a dishonest person is not made honest by having told
one less lie. To account for this, we can alter (29) as follows:
(30) For however dishonest a person is, the disposition to tell one less lie
will not make them honest
With (30), we are not simply altering the manifestations of the person’s dispo-
sitions, but whether they have the disposition altogether. Changing a person
from being disposed to tell a lie in a particular scenario to no longer being so
disposed can thus change whether or not they are honest.
Further confirming that virtue terms are total AAs is the fact that virtue
talk is subject to natural precisification. Virtue terms are sometimes used to
rule out those that are quite vicious. If a job candidate lies on an application,
a manager could refuse to consider them with a use of (31):
(31) We need someone who is honest
On other occasions though, virtue language can be used to rule out those that
are vicious even to a small degree. Suppose that an intelligence agency is hiring
a spy and, in the course of their interview, even though they do not lie, they
nevertheless fail to divulge one of their previous marriages. Intelligence staff
may move on from the candidate with a use of (31) even though the candidate
is very honest, a much stronger standard than someone who outright lies on
their application.
The case for virtue terms being total absolute gradable adjectives is thus
fairly strong. One way to develop the Stoic account of virtue then is by taking
virtue-theoretic adjectives to be AAs, uniting the Stoic model of ‘straight’ and
virtue terms under one semantic kind. Another reason to think that this read-
ing does not do too much violence to the Stoic view is their treatment of the
virtues and vagueness. Even though the Stoics were one of the earliest sources
to consider the Sorites paradox, they never entertained the thought that virtue
terms could give rise to a Sorites. Instead, there is an obvious cutoff in cases
of virtue. In considering Chrysippus’s exploration of Sorites-type arguments,
Susanne Bobzien points out that virtue was not something that Chrysippus
took to create a Sorites march: “In the case of Stoic virtue, there is no such
pattern. Rather, virtue is a limit. Once something is a heap, it can still grow
from a small heap to a bigger heap; once something counts as many, it can grow
from just many to very many, etc. But once someone has become virtuous,
they have become fully, maximally, perfectly, and most virtuous at that very
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time.”45 Thus, another point of agreement between the Stoic account of virtue
and understanding virtue terms to be AAs is that virtue terms do not give rise
to the Sorites.46
Because there are good arguments to think that virtue terms are neither con-
textually variable nor give rise to Sorites paradoxes, it is plausible that virtue
terms are total AAs. This is not to deny that it is possible to create a Sorites
context with imprecise uses of ‘virtuous.’ ‘Virtuous’ and ‘vicious’ are contradic-
tories, and thus the total AA should be capable of generating the Sorites when
used imprecisely. ‘Vicious’ is a partial AA as a set of actions that embody vice
to even a small degree are vicious, and ‘virtuous’ is total for it is true of sets of
actions that possess virtue to a maximal degree. Sure enough, ‘virtuous’ does
give rise to Sorites-paradoxical results when used imprecisely. Consider a case
where a bank teller is described as virtuous even though he has forged one check.
Will adding one more forged check to his resume make him vicious? Because
it is not clear that one more illegal money order would make him vicious, the
crucial premise of the Sorites takes hold. The partial AA, on the other hand,
does not yield this result because it is associated with a strict cutoff. This is
true of ‘vicious,’ as a believer who does not possess any degree of vice cannot
be described as vicious in any context.
4 Defending Stoic Virtue
In the last section, I made the case that taking virtue adjectives to be absolute
gradable adjectives is a promising development of the Stoic account of virtue,
uniting a number of Stoic commitments. In this section, I will show that un-
derstanding virtue terms as AAs can also make sense of (1)-(5). If virtue terms
are absolute gradable adjectives, this means that they track an underlying top-
closed scale as represented in Figure 1. To be virtuous is to reach the maximum
point in the scale. This makes sense of Perfect Virtue – just like with fullness,
only those who are at the top of the scale of can truly be called full or virtu-
ous. The scalar representation also helps make sense of Bivalence. Just like
every stick that is not straight is bent, everyone that is not virtuous falls below
the top degree in the scale, below the waves of the sea, and is for that reason
45See Bobzien (2002), p. 227.
46Due to the close connection between virtue and episteme outlined in Footnote 42, we might
also expect that many epistemic traits are expressible using absolute gradable adjectives.
An interesting case study in this regard is rationality. ‘Rational’ cannot be used with a
contextually accommodating threshold in the middle of its scale. Suppose that, upon looking
out the window and seeing no rain outside, Mary forms the belief that it is lightly raining.
John, on the other hand, forms the belief that it is not only cloudy and raining, but also
hailing. In such a case, even though Mary’s belief is less irrational than John’s, the following
is an infelicitous request:
#Point to the one who believed rationally.
Therefore, the unmarked form of ‘rational’ cannot be used to distinguish between beliefs in
the middle of the underlying scale of rationality. It could well be then that the Stoic view
that virtue-theoretic adjectives are AAs also has applications within epistemology.
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vicious. Taking virtue-theoretic terms as absolute gradable adjectives can thus
make sense of the basic Stoic picture of virtue.
Interpreting virtue adjectives as AAs also provides avenues of response to the
critics of Stoic virtue. Take Ordinary Virtue, for example. As we have seen,
AAs can be used imprecisely. When we say that a stadium is empty on game day,
Figure 1: Absolute Virtue
we are not being as precise as when
we say that the stadium is empty for
a demolition. The former application
of ‘empty’ is strictly false, but it is
good enough for the practical inter-
ests at play. The stadium does not
need to be entirely empty on game
day as it does when a deconstruction
project is in the offing. This point
holds for the virtues as well. It is
true to say that a person is honest
or courageous only if they are com-
pletely so. However, imprecise uses of
virtue-theoretic adjectives still have
their place – such uses can have prac-
tical value, like when making hiring
decisions that do not require someone
who is completely honest. This allows
the Stoics to make sense of Ordinary Virtue, that we often describe those who
are not completely virtuous as virtuous. Even though such descriptions are lit-
erally false, it is appropriate to describe them in this way because we are often
not concerned with perfect virtue on a day-to-day basis. Nevertheless, a theory
of virtue does not have to answer to merely imprecise applications of a concept.
The Stoics can maintain that only the fully virtuous are truly virtuous even
though we often use virtue terms imprecisely.
What about Comparative Virtue? Even though total AAs only permit
application of the unmarked form at the top of the scale, they nevertheless
allow comparisons in the middle of the scale. With ‘straight,’ even though it
is only true that a perfectly straight line is straight, it is possible to make true
comparative claims, like that rod A is straighter than rod B. Likewise, with
virtue terms, we have seen that it is possible to compare two individuals on the
underlying scale associated with the virtues. As we have seen, it is permissible
to use virtue terms in comparatives and with degree modifiers:
(32) Mary is more virtuous/honest/courageous than John
(33) Mary is very virtuous/honest/courageous, the most virtuous/honest/courageous
person I know
Even though neither Mary nor John are perfectly virtuous,(32) and (33) are
felicitous due to comparisons on the underlying scale. Thus, despite the fact
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that neither Mary nor John can be truly described using the unmarked form,
comparing where individuals fall on the underlying scale can make sense of
Comparative Virtue.
Similarly, this underlying scale is what makes Moral Progress possible.
Even though the prokopton only becomes virtuous after traversing the final step
on the scale, they were nevertheless making progress before they reached this
final stage. These improvements did not change their overall moral evaluation,
they still remained vicious at each step, but they nevertheless could satisfy
Moral Progress before the last stage in their moral development. Annas
defends the Stoics on this point, saying that, instead of talking about degrees
of virtue, we can instead speak in terms of degrees of moral progress:
The idea that there are no degrees of virtue does not mean that there
cannot be degrees of progress towards virtue. And the Stoics do believe
this, since they talk about the person who is making progress in living
better, the prokopton or ‘progressor’. When you reorder your priorties
and try to live up to your new commitments, you are progressing towards
virtue, and there can certainly be degrees of that.47
According to Annas, if we understand the Stoics as advocating progress towards
virtue rather than progress within virtue, then it is not inconsistent for them to
holdMoral Progress along with their other commitments. This progress, then,
can proceed along the underlying scale even though the change from vicious to
virtuous only happens at the final stage.
Conclusion
The goal of this paper was to give a contemporary interpretation capable of
defending the Stoic account of virtue. By understanding virtue terms as abso-
lute gradable adjectives, Stoics can maintain that (1)-(5) are all true, offering
an updated defense of a view that is often thought to be beyond the pale. This
modest stance, that taking virtue terms as AAs can help the Stoics respond
to certain sorts of criticisms, is not to say that the view offered in this paper
is correct. My purpose in this paper has been to show that, if we understand
virtue terms as AAs, there’s a contemporary interpretation of the Stoics that
can offer responses to some of its most pressing criticisms. If we go a step
further, however, and agree that virtue terms are absolute gradable adjectives,
then this has a significant number of consequences for theorizing about virtue.
If it is right to think of ‘virtuous’ as a total AA, then several philosophers
have missed the mark when theorizing about virtue. Take Rosalind Hursthouse,
for example. Hursthouse holds that whether or not a person is virtuous comes
in degrees:
47See Annas (2016).
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“As I noted...whether or not an adult definitely has a particular virtue is
a matter of degree.48
On Hursthouse’s view, whether or not a person possesses a certain virtue comes
in degrees. If the development of the Stoic view that is advanced in this paper
is correct, however, then Hursthouse is mistaken. Obtaining a particular virtue
requires perfection, and those who do not achieve this perfection do not prop-
erly possess the given virtue. Likewise, the contextual accounts of virtue offered
by Swanton and Russell are incompatible with a perfectionist understanding of
virtue. If the Stoics are correct, being virtuous is not simply a matter of being
virtuous enough, but being completely virtuous.49 Hursthouse’s, Swanton’s, and
Russell’s views are mistaken. A person cannot be virtuous if they only respond
to the circumstancess of life in a way that is good or virtuous enough. If a
person’s actions are only good enough or virtuous to a high degree, then at best
that person can satisfy a virtue predicate that is used imprecisely.
Furthermore, if virtue-theoretic adjectives are AAs, then Diogenes was right
to have a pessimistic view on the prospect of virtuous Athenians. The majority
of the citizens of Athens harbored some degree of vice, making most of them, if
not all, vicious. Instead of taking Diogenes to be unrealistic, however, and ex-
pecting too much of the Athenians, we can see that his high standards captured
the semantics of virtue terms. Diogenes refused to go along with imprecise appli-
cations of virtue terms, instead insisting that they be used in accord with their
actual truth conditions. Far from being a madman, Diogenes saw what only the
Stoics have had the courage to maintain – virtue requires moral perfection.
48See Hursthouse (1999), p. 145.
49Russell (2009) is an interesting case, as he anticipates several of the insights offered in this
paper. He notes that “thinking of virtue in terms of ideals is required on account of the very
sort of satis concept that virtue is.” (p. 112) Russell also notes that virtue-theoretic adjectives
as well as adjectives like ‘full’ have thresholds that are fixed by practical purposes (p. 118),
anticipating what can be seen by identifying virtue-theoretic adjectives as absolute gradable
adjectives.
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